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RESEARCH ARTICLE
A temporal perspective on staff support in the European 
parliament
Andreja Pegan a,b
aCentre of International Relations, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia; 
bDepartment of Social Sciences, Northumbria University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
ABSTRACT
This article analyses how the administrative-bureaucratic or staff 
support structures available to Members of the European 
Parliament (Secretariat officials, political group advisors and parlia-
mentary assistants) changed in response to the formal develop-
ment of the European Parliament into a legislature or 
parliamentarisation. Providing a temporal perspective, the aim is 
to explain bureaucratisation (as the processes whereby non-elected 
officials carry out elected representatives’ duties and tasks) as it 
presents in the EP today. Based on interviews and other data, 
findings show that while changes to administrative-bureaucratic 
structures have not always been timely to EP’s parliamentarisation, 
they strengthened the EP’s administrative capacity incrementally. 
Arguing that administrative and political structures develop differ-
ently at given moments and infringe upon another, the article 
discusses the consequences of staff support for democracy. The 
analysis shows that the diversity of administrative structures is a 







As a source of knowledge, bureaucracies are an important asset for running democratic 
government (Peters 2015). Yet, a large part of the European public thinks of the European 
Union’s (EU) bureaucracy as undemocratic (e.g. European Commission 2018, 7). This 
perception is linked to the cost of political delegation and bureaucratisation. Simply 
defined, bureaucratisation is the process whereby non-elected officials carry out duties 
and tasks of elected representatives (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981, ch. 1; Ellinas 
and Suleiman 2012, 89; Meier and O’Toole 2006, 12). It is related to the term politicised 
competences, which describe the shrinking distance between politicians and civil ser-
vants (e.g. Romanyshyn and Neuhold 2013). Bureaucratisation requires attention because 
the actions of unelected officials do not have the same legitimacy as the actions of those 
chosen by the people (Meier and O’Toole 2006, 12).
Balancing the cost and benefits of bureaucracy – defined here as unelected officials 
and administrators – is one of the many challenges democracies face. In examining this 
challenge for the EU institutions, scholarly discussion has focused on the largest 
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bureaucracy – the European Commission. In the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty, several 
scholars have raised questions on delegation and the bureaucratisation of policy-making 
in the parliamentary context. Studying the European Parliament (EP), researchers found 
that legislative staff do not merely implement parliamentarians’ decisions but also engage 
in tasks relevant to policy and politics, such as drafting amendments and proposing 
compromises (Dobbels and Neuhold 2013). These findings, combined with unfavourable 
public opinion, show the continued importance to raise questions on the role of bureau-
cracy in democratic systems.
Compared to previous studies, this article adopts a temporal perspective on the 
development of administrative structures. It is asked how the parliamentarisation of the 
EP – understood as the formal institutionalisation of the EP into a legislature with 
representative, budgetary, scrutiny and law-making functions (Rittberger 2012, 45–49) – 
has affected the administrative-bureaucratic or staff support structures in the EP, namely 
the staff of the Secretariat, the staff of political groups and the personal staff of MEPs. A 
historical institutionalist analysis is adopted, stressing the need to study bureaucratisation 
as a process that unfolds over time (Pierson 2003).
Taking a long-term perspective on the administrative players of the EP is pertinent for a 
couple of reasons. For the first three decades of the EP (as the Common Assembly and 
Parliamentary Assembly), administrative players were permanently based in parliament. 
Members were nominated in national parliaments and came to the EP monthly. While 
political leadership offers a crucial vehicle for the democratic control of bureaucracy (Page 
and Wouters 1994), in the EP, it was limited by the part-time nature of the job of its 
members. These starting conditions might have given administrative players leeway to 
develop their functions and influence the way administrators interact with policy-makers 
today. A temporal analysis can also enrich our understanding of institutional change since 
outcomes (e.g. reforms of administrative structures) can occur at a considerable distance 
from the appearance of a central cause (e.g. parliamentarisation) (Orren and Skowronek 
1994; Sewell 1996). Adopting a temporal perspective, the article provides an empirical 
contribution by contextualising the development of bureaucratisation beyond the Lisbon 
Treaty. The article also shows the relevance of studying administrative structures in their 
own right to further our understanding of the quality of democracy in parliament.
Based on interviews, primary and secondary data, findings show that the EP’s bureau-
cratic structures have been reshaped incrementally but not always promptly following 
parliamentarisation. Reforms have altered the balance between elected officials and admin-
istrators while maintaining the latter’s legitimacy. From a period when the Secretariat’s 
administrators had leeway, support became more balanced. The source of advice has 
diversified between staff in the Secretariat, political groups and MEPs’ offices. Staff support 
provision has also become fairer, as both individual members and collective bodies (com-
mittees, party groups, the plenary, etc.) have access to services. While the recast of admin-
istrative structures has not always been timely with the EP’s political evolution into a fully- 
fledged legislature, it has followed the path of parliamentary (administrative) autonomy as 
initially charted in the 1950s. The absence of timely reforms has had more consequences on 
the EP’s efficacy than the legitimacy of administrative actions.
In the following, the article reviews the literature on the EP administration, given its 
approach to bureaucratisation and explains time dimensionality concerning the develop-
ment of the politico-bureaucratic relationship in the EP. What follows is the presentation 
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of empirical data and a discussion. In conclusion, the main findings, limits and avenues for 
further research are outlined.
Parliamentary staff and bureaucratisation
This article’s conceptualisation of bureaucratisation follows the understanding of bureau-
cracy as the ensemble of non-elected actors employed in the Secretariat, political groups, 
and MEPs’ offices. Consequently, bureaucratisation is defined as the process whereby 
non-elected actors carry out elected representatives’ duties and tasks (Aberbach, Putnam, 
and Rockman 1981, ch. 1). The term politicised competences has been used to describe 
the shrinking distance between politicians and civil servants (Romanyshyn and Neuhold 
2013). These are broadly the same phenomena questioning the action legitimacy of 
unelected officials (Meier and O’Toole 2006, 12). In this article, I use the concept of 
bureaucratisation as it signifies a temporal process (Torstendahl 2001, 1410).
While relatively unexplored compared to its American counterparts, administrative 
actors in parliament are a growing research area in Europe. Most of the research has 
been focused on comparing MPs’ work as elected representatives and the work done by 
staff as unelected actors working in parliament. Bureaucratisation has been assessed from 
the view of task delegation, considering premises of rational behaviour and principal- 
agent models. To a lesser extent, research has looked into administrators’ descriptive 
characteristics and behavioural attitudes. A clear-cut understanding of the extent of 
bureaucratisation has so far proved elusive, which shows scope for continued research. 
Part of the problem is that the EP’s administration is diversified and active in several policy 
areas that are differently politicised (e.g. given the influence that the treaties confer to the 
EP or societal interest). In the following, I explore how bureaucratisation has been 
analysed so far, but first, a review of EP’s administrative-bureaucratic structures is 
provided.
Parliamentary administrative structures
The EP’s administration or bureaucracy consists of three actors sharing an unelected 
status: the staff or officials employed in the Secretariat, political advisors of party groups 
and MEPs’ assistants. In 2020, there were 5,351 Secretariat staff, 1,282 group staff and 
3,287 MEP assistants (European Union 2020; European Parliament 2020). Secretariat staff 
are recruited through competitive tests formalising a Weberian-style bureaucracy in 
neutrality requirements, professionalism and a hierarchical career structure. Political 
advisors tend to be recruited via competitions organised at the level of individual political 
groups. The majority are either members or sympathisers of a party (Ruiter 2019, 170). 
Assistants are recruited directly by MEPs and work either in parliament or the constitu-
ency. Compared to Secretariat’s staff, political advisors and assistants’ employment is less 
secure and dependent on electoral volatility, where job security is generally greater for 
the former.
Different working conditions mean that the legitimacy of Secretariat staff is derived 
from their civil service status. In contrast, the legitimacy of political advisors and MEP 
assistants depends on political trust to the group and MEP. Given the different legitimacy 
sources, staff in the EP are interdependent in assisting MEPs (Neunreither 2002), and a 
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balance between them needs to be struck to preserve democratic legitimacy (Provan 
2001). So far, research has focused on understanding the role of committee officials 




The majority of studies has looked at bureaucratisation from the point of task delegation. 
Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) developed a typology specifying the production, service and 
steering roles of the EP Secretariat. The production role (e.g. offering knowledge, advice 
and skills to politicians) represents the lowest level of involvement in policy-making 
compared to the service role (e.g. procedural advice and briefings) and steering role 
(e.g. drafting agendas, writing reports and proposing compromises). Bureaucratisation 
can be discerned when staff carry out politicised tasks beyond a production role. Such 
behaviour has been observed on non-salient issues and politically sensitive dossiers 
(Dobbels and Neuhold 2013; Romanyshyn and Neuhold 2013; Neuhold and Dobbels 
2015; Högenauer, Neuhold, and Christiansen 2016; Coremans and Meissner 2018). On 
the other hand, Winzen (2011) and Neuhold and Radulova (2006, 57) observed that MEPs 
have a high degree of discretion and maintain the overall system’s equilibrium by 
adjusting relations between experts, bureaucrats and interest groups. Ruiter (2019) 
reached similar conclusions for political group advisors highlighting that they engage in 
politically influential activity only to the extent to which they pursue the party group 
interest.
Attitudes
Another strand of literature looks at staff’s involvement given their attitudes and beha-
viour, mostly based on organisation theory. While the body of literature published by 
Neuhold and co-authors highlights the policy- and politics- conditions for bureaucratisa-
tion, Egeberg et al. (2013) show that parliament’s organisation affects how staff perform 
their tasks. A concrete example involving Secretariat officials is provided in Kuehnhanss 
et al. (2017), who found that higher levels of organisational identification translate into 
risk-averse behaviour where staff tries to minimise policy failures endangering the EP. One 
infers that changes to the organisation (e.g. strategies, missions statements, and career 
ladders) lead to changes in staff support. Consequently, organisational reforms inculcat-
ing administrators with mission statements emphasising responsiveness to political 
authority can minimise the negative effects of bureaucratisation (see Meier and O’Toole 
2006, 10).
Scholars looking at staff’s sources of information and how these potentially impact the 
quality of advice provided to MEPs have also adopted an attitudinal inquiry line. Marshall 
(2012) found that, as an information source, lobbyists undermine staff independence. 
Laurens (2018, 138) concluded that consulting lobbyists provide staff with an overview 
picture that ultimately helps them devise compromises. Egeberg et al. (2013, 510) reached 
similar conclusions, showing that political group advisors are more likely to pay attention 
to lobby groups and sectoral interests than party group officials who put the party line 
first (also Ruiter 2019, 15). Despite different attitudes towards information sources, 
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Egeberg et al. (2013, 511) conclude that both staff groups can provide professional advice, 
which can be politicised or non-politicised depending on MEPs’ requirements (Provan 
2001; Winzen 2011). These studies show how attitudes such as inclination towards certain 
sources of information influence the unfolding of bureaucratisation and the type of 
support staff provide.
Descriptive representativeness
In a sociological study, Michon (2014) looked at the personal capital of French parliamen-
tary assistants. He found that they form an epistemic community with its own identity and 
norms of behaviour, hinting that bureaucracy can be an issue for democracy regarding 
staff descriptive (un)representativeness. Pegan (2015, 192) observed that gender affects 
how staff perform some tasks, notably female staff report higher frequencies on admin-
istrative tasks and lower frequencies on policy-shaping tasks. On the other hand, Egeberg 
et al. (2013) found little evidence supporting the hypothesis that staff’ s nationality, 
gender or education affect their decision-making behaviour. These studies are insightful 
insofar they give cues on staff’s descriptive nature. Unlike in North America, where 
research shows that race and gender contribute to the nature of advice staff provide 
(e.g. Wilson 2013), this inquiry line remains underdeveloped in Europe.
Summing up, the literature has mainly concentrated on studying political-bureaucratic 
relationships given task delegation and attitudes. These are two of the images through 
which bureaucratisation manifest itself. Other possible indicators remain unexplored, 
including the rate of personnel circulation between political and administrative careers 
(cf. Alexander 2020) and the intensity of partisan appointments (Torstendahl 2001). 
Moreover, most of the studies focus on the post-Lisbon era, neglecting past develop-
ments. The following section introduces a temporal perspective to the study of adminis-
trative structures in the EP.
A temporal perspective
This article leans on historical institutionalism to bring temporality at the centre of the 
research investigation of EP’s administrative-bureaucratic structures. The guiding assump-
tion is that events that have shaped the EP into a legislature are connected to changes in 
the EP’s administrative-bureaucratic organisation. Most of the recent research holds such 
an assumption but has focused on the Lisbon Treaty changes. For example, Coremans and 
Meissner (2018) explored the EP trade committee’s policy capacity before and after the 
Lisbon Treaty. Dobbels and Neuhold (2013) hypothesised that the Lisbon Treaty would 
increase Secretariat officials’ importance in policy-making. In common with this literature, 
the article builds on the assumption that the EP’s parliamentarisation has affected 
administrative structures and explores the effects of other events besides the Lisbon 
Treaty.
The purpose is to observe how the EP’s bureaucracy developed formal attributes (e.g. 
organisation, recruitment and working conditions; see Egeberg et al. 2013) given EP’s 
parliamentarisation starting from the 1950s when the EP’s predecessor was established. 
Parliamentarisation stands for the formal institutionalisation of the EP as a legislature 
through the gain of representative, budgetary, scrutiny and law-making functions 
(Rittberger 2012). The EP exercised some of these functions already in the 1950s (i.e. the 
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control, deliberation and consultative roles), but a ‘push’ towards a legislature happened 
in the 1970s when it obtained budgetary powers and European elections made possible 
direct citizen representation. Other moments in the EP’s parliamentarisation can be 
identified in the introduction and the extension of decision-making procedures.1 These 
events are treated as critical junctures or opportunities for generating change.
In historical institutionalism, preferences are historical products, meaning that past 
developments influence present choices (Pierson 2000; Thelen 2003). From a historical- 
institutionalist perspective, starting arrangements are particularly relevant because they 
can be historically foundational, initiate path-dependency and lock-in future develop-
ments (Orren and Skowronek 1994; Pierson 2000). In this interpretation, when rather than 
what has happened is critical for the evolution of an institution. The EP’s foundational 
period has provided specific conditions for the organisations of administrative-bureau-
cratic structures. In the absence of permanent MEPs, the EP’s Secretariat operated 
relatively unchecked and had the opportunity to develop leeway from MEPs’ control, 
which could affect the balance between the different sources of administrative support in 
parliament (Camenen 1995; Costa 2003).
Theorising change
To explain how parliamentarisation might have impacted administrative-bureaucratic 
structures since the foundational period, it is useful to turn to the writings on the 
temporal separation between causes (parliamentarisation) and outcomes (changes to 
administrative structures and bureaucratisation) (Pierson 2003). Temporal separation 
means a time separation between the onset of a cause and the main effect’s development 
with changes occurring at different speeds or sequence.
Analyses based on historical institutionalism predict that change results from contin-
uous processes or after a build-up of stress to a critical level that punctuates a stability 
period or equilibrium. In a continuous process, changes are incremental and cumulative 
over time, introduce partial alternations to existing institutions without replacing old ones 
(Schickler 2001). These outcomes consolidate an institution through a logic of increasing 
returns to an initially set path. Gradual change can also occur through conversion, where 
existing institutions are altered to serve new purposes (Thelen and Mahoney 2010). In the 
event of critical junctures, change can be rapid and highly visible (i.e. the threshold effect 
model), or it can occur with some distance from the tipping point (i.e. casual chain model) 
(Jervis 1997). In the latter scenario, changes are perceived as unintended or by-products 
because they have not been (rationally) planned by those implementing and planning a 
process or event. While critical junctures break stability periods, they can induce path- 
dependent processes where outcomes triggered by a process at one point in time 
reinforce themselves as times goes by from the original event (Collier and Collier 1991).
Building on the temporal separation between causes and outcomes, the question is, 
how has parliamentarisation changed administrative structures set in the 1950s: Did 
administrative structures change promptly, breaking path-dependency or have they 
changed incrementally following parliamentarisation?
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Theorising democratic consequences
Events shaping the EP into a legislature have foremost targeted the EU’s political work-
ings. They have influenced how the EP organises its political structures, for instance, the 
competence division among committees. As a matter of functionality, one would expect 
administrative-bureaucratic changes to parallel the course of EP’s political workings. One 
benefit of such development is that political and administrative-bureaucratic structures 
work in tandem, where the latter ideally support EP’s political capacity to strengthen 
democratic government. However, a historical-institutionalist explanation predicts that 
political and administrative institutions can follow different evolutionary paths creating a 
time gap between outcomes. As Orren and Skowronek (1994, 321) explain, institutional 
arrangements are underpinned by different temporal orders and change because they are 
bound up with what goes on in other institutions. To theorise such an alternative, the 
article adopts a layered view of institutions, where institutions are made of arrangements 
which (can) operate following different logics and abrade on one another (Orren and 
Skowronek 1994).
Applied to this article, the EP’s institutional order is conceived as the ensemble of EP’s 
political structures (e.g. committees, party and MEPs) and administrative-bureaucratic 
structures (Secretariat, party group and MEPs staff). Following Orren and Skowronek 
(1994, 321), institutional arrangements such as the EP are underpinned by different 
temporal orders, meaning that EP’s political and bureaucratic arrangements have their 
own histories, change at different times and varying rates. Building on this assumption 
allows asking how has parliamentarisation shaped bureaucratisation or the relationship 
between political and administrative-bureaucratic structures to learn about the effects on 
democratic government.
Summing up, based on historical institutionalism, the article assumes that parliamen-
tarisation shaped the EP’s administrative-bureaucratic organisation either incrementally 
(path-dependency explanation) or transformationally (punctuated equilibrium explana-
tion). Adopting a layered view of institutions, it is assumed that different temporal orders 
underpin political and administrative-bureaucratic structures. The latter permits discuss-
ing administrative-bureaucratic changes and bureaucratisation in the context of demo-
cratic government.
Data
The article builds on interviews, primary and secondary resources. To avoid self-selecting 
evidence, which is sometimes present in political science research leaning on history 
(Kaiser, Leucht, and Rasmussen 2009), resources are corroborated whenever possible. 
Among primary resources, I consulted the annual budgets of the EC/EU and EP reports. 
For earlier accounts on staff support structures, I draw on reports with archival data (e.g. 
Piodi 2008). Semi-structured interviews with eleven individuals were conducted in 2012, 
2013 and 2015 (listed at the end). Respondents included two secretary generals, four 
directors, two middle managers, one high official of a political group and two parliamen-
tary assistants. Three respondents listed as employees in the EP Secretariat had also 
worked in political groups. Three respondents were retired. All the others were in EP’s 
active service, except for one who worked in the European Commission. The respondents 
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were selected considering their experience, long-term career in the EP and snowballing. 
Interview data were analysed with content analysis.
EP administration
The following section presents the EP’s administrative arrangements from the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) until the establishment of the Directorate-General for 
Research (DG EPRS) in 2014. The ECSC is treated as the foundational period with several 
contingencies for organising administrative-bureaucratic structures. The choice in the 
period is assumed to have impacted any future developments following 
parliamentarisation.
Foundational period
Two ideas circulated for the administrative organisation of the Common Assembly in the 
1950s (Guerrieri 2008, 191). One solution predicted that the administration of the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe would become the administration of 
the ECSC Common Assembly. A second solution envisaged creating a separate adminis-
tration, which could be either temporarily seconded from national institutions or perma-
nent. The outcome was a compromise, as seen in the High Authority, which included 
intergovernmental and supranational aspects of administrative organisations (Seidel 
2010, 9).
The intergovernmental aspect consisted of a temporary service of clerks seconded 
from national parliamentary administrations every time the Common Assembly was in 
session. By 1957, 101 officials were seconded from national parliaments for meetings in 
Strasbourg (Piodi 2008, 14). These temporary clerks took care of running sessions, minutes 
and stenographic services (Guerrieri 2008, 850). In addition, every national delegation 
received support from their respective national parliaments, which is a common practice 
for inter-parliamentary assemblies.
In 1953, the Common Assembly agreed on the employment of the first permanent staff 
and the basic conditions for its Secretariat’s workings (Guerrieri 2008, 191, 2012, 849). By 
the end of the ECSC, 132 permanent staff were employed in four services: committees, 
studies, information and documentation, general services and administration (Piodi 2008, 
17). The number of staff began to swell, while an immutable number of representatives 
(78) met between once and five times a year. The supranational organisation also 
included political group secretariats, which were financed from the Assembly’s budget 
(Guerrieri 2015, 395; Krumrey 2018, pp. 124–125). This was a departure from previous 
practices in inter-parliamentary assemblies in which delegations were assisted by national 
parliamentary administrations, and added to the parliamentary administrative organisa-
tion of the ECSC.
Changes to EP administrative structures
By the 1970s, the EP administrations underwent a series of changes. With the adoption of 
the Staff Regulation in 1956, a permanent European civil service was institutionalised 
(Page 1997, 7; Seidel 2010, 30–31). The regulation was reformed for the first time in 1962 
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to regulate the employment of temporary staff, which formalised the position of political 
group employees. Following the Rome Treaty, the Secretariat was restructured from four 
into five services (Piodi 2008, 16–17), which persisted until the reform Rising the game in 
2003 (Kungla 2007).
Parliamentary reports received limited attention from members, which gave adminis-
trators leeway (Interviews A; B; C; F; G; Camenen 1995; Costa 2003; Guerrieri 2012, 850). For 
instance, the former Secretary-General Priestley reminisced: ‘I remember a time before 
1979 when the Secretariat was writing the reports, and you were lucky if the members 
read them’ (Interview A). Different reasons can explain the relative autonomy that 
administrators exercised in the period before 1979. For one, the Secretariat’s autonomy 
stemmed from the physical absence of members with a dual representative mandate in 
national parliaments and the EP. Some MEPs had a low interest in European affairs, limited 
ambition to control an organisation’s service, which had little formal power to influence 
the EU or did not have the expertise to engage in the technical matters put forward to the 
Assembly. Former Secretary-General Vinci, who started his career in the EP in the 1960s as 
a junior official in the committee for public health, remembered that members had very 
limited knowledge on the technical aspects of the Community policies (Interview C):
Economic integration involved some difficult technical aspects. The parliamentarian had 
great difficulties in understanding these technicalities. When the Common Agriculture 
Policy became operational [1962], common prices had to be fixed. Who knew how to do it? 
The parliamentarian had no idea, and it was the official, whose advantage was to be a 
technician, that knew what common prices meant. The European officials, who stayed in 
Luxembourg 365 days a year, knew much more than parliamentarians, who came to the EP 
for five weeks per year. And because many things were being done on a technical level, there 
was less politics and members were less interested in the Communities.
The EP Secretariat’s importance can also be explained by the relative weakness of political 
group staff and MEPs parliamentary assistants. Financial resources for these administra-
tive structures were comparatively low to the Secretariat until the first direct elections 
(Figure 1). While the Secretariat employed at least two officials per committee, most 
political groups’ advisors worked concurrently in more than one committee (Table 1).
In contrast, Secretariat’s committee services were established already in the 1950s, 
which allowed administrators to gain and accumulate technical and policy knowledge 
that is today associated with the production role of committee staff (Guerrieri 2012, 850). 
For example, in some cases, such as setting agricultural prices, the policy was technical, 
and Secretariat staff took a steering role (Interviews C; G). On salient issues such as the 
Community budget, where the EP’s control functions increased substantially in the 1970s, 
Secretariat staff played at least a production role drawing up documents (Interview A; C; 
D; Priestley 2008, 13). The adoption of two budgetary treaties directed a significant 
amount of human resources towards the Budgets committee’s staffing, which in 1977 
included seven administrators (Table 1). On the other hand, the staff of other committees 
ranged from two to five administrators.
‘A moment of disorientation’
The first direct elections in 1979 and the formal legislative empowerment of the EP that 
took off in the 1980s were expected to affect the delivery and nature of support from 
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unelected officials (Interviews E; I; Provan 2001). With directly elected MEPs and a larger 
quantity of work with possibilities to impact legislation, a democratically accountable 
parliament required less administrative initiative and more interest and awareness from 
MEPs to draft legislation (Interviews B; E; G; I). For instance, Pier Virgilio Dastoli, parlia-
mentary assistant to MEP Spinelli from 1977 to 1986 and subsequently temporary agent in 
the EP, witnessed this evolution (Interview E):
From the moment the EP acquired a legislative role, the officials of the parliament had to 
change the way they were working. With the Single [European] Act, the cooperation proce-
dure, the Maastricht Treaty and all subsequent treaty changes the work of the members and 
officials became more detailed from the point of view of legislation. Therefore, we [officials] 
could no longer allow ourselves to have a fantasy approach. The texts that we were writing 
were texts that later on were transformed into law.
However, the Provan report in the early 2000s signalled that legislative assistance was not 
keeping pace with parliament’s evolution (Provan 2001, 4). Support for MEPs required a 
clearer ‘distinction between the political sphere (occupied by group staff and members’ 
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advisors) and a high-quality and non-partisan civil service (secretariats, research services, 
legal advisors)’, which would make the democratic control over the bureaucracy easier to 
attain (Provan 2001, 10). For instance, a Secretariat official recounted the situation reign-
ing in the EP in the 1990s in the following manner (Interview I):
After parliament had acquired new functions, there was a moment of disorientation. The 
members needed some time to adapt. Then, the parliamentarians started to take political 
initiatives as it was their right. And maybe when they did, there was a disconnection with 
respect to the Secretariat. The Se cretariat was destabilised, and as a result, it did not provide 
the immediate technical support, which was needed. But this lasted for a very short time 
because then it became clear that the Secretariat was to follow the members’ political 
initiative and offer them duly and immediate assistance.
Modernisation
The Provan report highlighted the changing nature of the EP into a legislature required 
from the Secretariat to strengthen its reputation of high-quality and non-partisanship 
(Provan 2001, 5). Addressing issues in the Provan report proceeded incrementally over a 
long period starting in 2003 with the reform ‘Rising the game’ (Kungla 2007). The reform 
united under the same directorate procedural and research services for committees, 
following a policy domain organisation. For example, nowadays, the directorate covering 
economic policies consists of committee secretariats and a unit responsible for studies in 
the economic policy domain. Secretariat’s support for committees was streamlined as 
procedural and research support are since then provided from Brussels.2 A decade after 
Rising the game, the new Directorate-General for Research (DG EPRS) was set up in 2014. 
Among its duties, was also the assistance of individual members (European Parliament 
2013, 13–14 Interview H).
The latest changes to the administrative support system are about parliamentary 
assistants. In 2001, the Provan report recommended that MEPs view parliamentary 
assistants as political advisors (Provan 2001, 4, 8–9). While MEPs received an allowance 
for individual assistance since 1974, parliamentary assistants’ role developed towards an 
administrative rather than a political one. Even when the allowance for personal assis-
tance increased, their posts remained less prestigious than positions in the Secretariat and 
political groups because they were not formalised in the Staff regulations (Interviews J; K). 
The integration of personal assistants in the Staff regulations was put on the agenda in 
1998, 2001 and 2008, when an assistant statute was finally agreed upon. Alongside the 
set-up of DG EPRS in 2014, this was important for guaranteeing legislative assistance to 
individual members compared to collective bodies (e.g. committees and political groups). 
Since 2008, the EP has been incrementally changing rules for the recruitment of assistants 
also to respond to media criticism of the transparency of information (Interview K; OCCRP 
2015).
Overall, parliamentary assistants’ growing profile has raised concerns among political 
groups over their primacy in providing legislative and political support. These concerns 
relate to the traditional nature of representation in Europe, where political groups are a 
source of political stability, policy-making and linkage between elites and citizens. 
Consequently, attempts to strengthen the organising abilities of MEPs beyond the party 
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group can be interpreted as weakening the traditionally strong functions of parties in 
Europe (Interview J).
These ‘anxieties’ pale to some extent when looking at the recruitment of senior officials 
in the Secretariat from political groups’ lines, which can be seen to strengthen party 
groups (Interview C). Indeed, by the late 1990s, ‘politically tainted’ recruitment became 
apparent at the level of the EP’ s Secretary-General and to some extent the Director- 
General and Director level (Camenen 1995, 149; Guerrieri 2012, 853; Interviews C; G). Four 
of the previous five Secretaries-General had occupied the post of Secretaries-General in a 
political group, and the last three had also served in an EP’s presidential cabinet. This type 
of politicised career was, for instance, described by a respondent (Interview G):
In the 1980s, political groups were increasingly saying: “Careful, we need to be aware that 
there is a political split there and we cannot leave these tasks to apolitical administrators in 
the parliament. We want to have our own people in the administration.” So, in the beginning 
of the 1990s political groups became directly osmosing into the administration. As long as 
they had a certain amount of years and qualifications, they could just move. So a person 
working for a political group would move to the Secretariat.
While several appointments in the Secretariat have a political character, some respon-
dents believed that politicised recruitment does not automatically favour one political 
group over another (Interview A; J). With some uncertainty over the consequences of such 
appointments, this is an area that might generate changes in the future. Admittedly, the 
Provan report recommended that movement from one administrative structure to 
another should entail a ‘one-way ticket’ (Provan 2001, 10). However, this recommendation 
has not so far appeared in the Staff Regulations.
Genesis, change and historical institutionalism
In the model of representative democracy, the process of governance is unattainable 
without administrators or a bureaucracy. One challenge facing democratic institutions 
such as the EP and their political leaders is establishing administrative autonomy and 
strengthening administrative capacity so that administrations remain adept in the face of 
new challenges. Another one is to control the bureaucracy so that administrators do not 
replace democratically chosen representatives but become a source of political strength. 
The division of responsibility between political and administrative structures is key to the 
quality of democracy but subject to evolving processes and events that disturb any 
balance previously attained.
The foundational period of the EP during the ECSC set the conditions for the devel-
opment of administrative structures as the EP acquired the competences of a legislature. 
The initial organisation included temporary (seconded) services from national parlia-
ments, permanent Secretariat services and party group secretariats. Considering that 
one of the contingencies involved an administrative organisation under the Council of 
Europe, the Secretariat guaranteed the EP independent administrative capacity, which 
ensured autonomy from other institutions already in the beginning.3 Administrative 
autonomy was further strengthened when seconded services from national parliaments 
were replaced with permanent Secretariat services. The foundational period can broadly 
be considered as setting a path towards EP’s administrative autonomy as a parliament.
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While the EP exacted administrative autonomy through the Secretariat’s services 
already in the 1950s, it spent far more time developing autonomous capacity for its 
various political structures, namely committees, political groups and individual MEPs. 
Moreover, changes were not always timely, meaning they occurred with some distance 
from the critical events defining EP’s formal parliamentarisation. The case of the 
Secretariat and the development of a pluralistic market of support illustrate this point. 
While the organisation of the Secretariat kept pace with the introduction of budgetary 
prerogatives in the 1970s, it no longer provided the expected assistance following the EP’s 
legislative empowerment in the late 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, interview respondents 
described a ‘moment of disorientation’ between MEPs’ needs and the support they 
received. Solutions to weaknesses concerning research and legislative support in the 
Secretariat were implemented incrementally over two decades, starting in the early 
2000s with Rising the game and continued in the 2010s with the modernisation of 
research services.
Another example showing the discontinuity of administratisinceve organisation from 
EP’s formal parliamentarisation and development of its political structures is the devel-
opment of pluralistic sources of administrative support within parliament. Unlike execu-
tive administrations, which serve one political master, parliamentary administrations 
serve members from different political leanings. Setting up Weberian conditions for 
impartial and neutral services, such as the one for the EP’s Secretariat, is one element 
providing fair support in parliament. Making available resources for assistance in the 
manifestation of party group secretariats and personal assistants on an equal basis is 
another element since these structures provide different-natured advice to MEPs than the 
Secretariat. Today, the EP is serviced by various well-resourced administrative support 
structures: the Secretariat, party group staff and MEPs’ personal assistants. However, the 
development of a pluralistic market of staff support within parliament occurred incre-
mentally and was discontinued from EP’s formal parliamentarisation. Indeed, neither 
direct elections nor treaty changes appear to be directly associated with party group 
secretariats and assistants’ reforms. While political groups developed their secretariats 
from the very beginning guaranteeing support for MEPs groups, personal staff became a 
relevant source only later.
While incremental, changes to the Secretariat and the diversification of staff structures 
professionalised the EP administrative-bureaucratic organisation and strengthened EP’s 
administrative capacity. Today, the EP is among the best-resourced parliamentary admin-
istrations worldwide alongside the US Congress. The Secretariat’s reform and the con-
solidation of a pluralistic market of staff support can be seen as a continuation of early 
efforts establishing the EP’s autonomy insofar they have upgraded the EP’s autonomy vis- 
a-vis other institutions with internal autonomy whereby all political actors are appropri-
ately resourced.
The delayed response to EP’s parliamentarisation was not detrimental to the EP’s 
exercise of democratic control over its bureaucracy. When bureaucratic-administrative 
structures reformed, changes accommodated the preceding shifts in the political climate, 
meaning that parliamentarisation as an exogenous event has had a marked, albeit 
delayed, effect on bureaucratisation. Since changes to the political order preceded 
modifications to the administrative one, the sequence was favourable for the exercise 
of democratic control over the administration. Concerning administrative capacity, 
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reforms created some tensions between administrative structures. For instance, the set- 
up of a directorate-general for research and the statute for parliamentary assistants 
emphasise support for MEPs as individuals over their collective membership in political 
groups. According to some interviews, empowering individual MEP over collective bodies, 
such as political groups, can disrupt the representative model of democracy, where 
parties carry important linkage and policy-making functions. The outstanding question 
is whether a timely adaptation of research services and individual MEP support services 
would have eased some of these tensions or whether these tensions are inevitable and 
part of a democratic system.
Overall, the early EP’s period set its administrative organisations on a path towards a 
parliamentary model guaranteeing administrative autonomy from outside organisations. 
Later changes were incremental and built EP’s internal administrative capacity for com-
mittees, party groups and MEPs. Changes were path-dependent since they enhanced the 
EP’s autonomy vis-a-vis other institutions with internal autonomy where all political actors 
are appropriately resourced.
Conclusion
Following the Lisbon Treaty, several researchers have turned to analyse the role of 
administrative players in the parliamentary context of the EU. This article has also looked 
at administrative-bureaucratic structures but adopted a temporal perspective. It has 
theorised the temporal connection between the EP’s formal developments into a legis-
lature and outcomes connected to administrative structures: the staff of the Secretariat, 
political groups, and MEPs’ offices. In addition, this article theorised that administrative 
and political structures follow different evolutionary paths with consequences for demo-
cratic government.
The findings show that the EP’s formal empowerment required time to affect the EP’s 
administrative structures but that incremental changes followed a path towards administra-
tive autonomy and capacity. The recast of administrative structures, which has not always 
been timely with the EP’s parliamentarisation, has not affected the legitimacy of administrative 
actions. The analysis also showed that the diversity of administrative structures helps keep a 
balance between elected and non-elected officials and is a source of democratic control.
The article followed the formal development of powers conferred to the EP by treaties. 
Historical accounts show that the EP played a symbolic power and used its competences 
ingeniously even when it was formally a weak player among EU institutions. Therefore, 
when exploring bureaucratisation, we would benefit from studies applying theory to 
cases when the EP and its leadership attempted to exert influence outside their formal 
means and the role of administrative players in these events. The relative importance of 
treaties and procedures under which the EP operates could equally be put under con-
sideration. In theoretical terms, this means there is a need to problematise the critical 
junctures in the EP’s parliamentarisation.
Finally, this article’s empirical part suggests that temporal order theorisation can be 
enriched with other approaches to institutional theory. For instance, the forming period of 
ECSC in the early 1950s and the EP’s development of administrative structures following 
models seen in parliamentary systems is a good laboratory to test sociological institu-
tionalism assumptions such as isomorphism and rational choice ideas of functional 
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adaptation. Similarly, we would enrich our understanding of the balance between the 
Secretariat, political group secretariats and MEP personal staff by looking at rational 
choice explanations of bargaining. Given public opinion and media reporting, the latter 
appears to be the most interesting avenue for future research. In all cases, weaving 
institutionalists perspectives together will enrich our understanding of change and trans-
formation. Therefore, further work should integrate questions on the nature of changes, 
their temporality, and underlying causes. Such questioning can lead us to examine 
exogenous events such as parliamentarisation and the turning points generated 
endogenously.
Notes
1. Enlargements are not considered because they have neither altered the formal nature of 
representative democracy nor affected parliament’s formal organisation (e.g. Pegan 2017). 
Nevertheless, they are important for understanding the informal realms of organisations in 
terms of culture – an unexplored issue for the EP.
2. Before Rising the game, research units were based in Luxembourg, while committees and 
plenaries were in Brussels and Strasbourg, which led to a poorly visible research division 
(Interview H).
3. See Trondal (2017) for a discussion on autonomy and capacity.
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